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THE VOTER REALIGNMENT IN THE
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RAY M. SHORTRIDGE
University of Michigan
American voting patterns exhibit long periods of relative
stability in the voters’ partisan preferences. This conti-
nuity, however, is occasionally interrupted by a sudden shift in
party loyalties. This inquiry focuses on the shift of party
loyalties in the 1850s which gave rise to the Republican party.
During the 1850s, the national party system underwent a
massive reorganization. At the beginning of the decade, the
Democrats and the Whigs were the major contenders for
national political power, and the Democracy enjoyed domi-
nance. A third party, the Free Soil, experienced limited success
in the North. At the end of the decade, both the Whig party and
the Free Soil party had vanished. A fourth party, the nativistic
American, had emerged to contest the 1856 Presidential
election, but it, too, had essentially disappeared from the
Northern political scene by 1860. Only the Democracy survived
the decade. A dynamic new element in American politics, the
Republican party, contested the 1856 campaign and won the
electoral votes of the six New England states, New York, Ohio,
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa. The 1860 election brought
triumph to the new party as the Republicans swept the
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Northern states and elected Abraham Lincoln President of the
United States. To obtain a clearer view of the realignment, this
study examines the flow of the vote among the political parties
in the Midwest through the 1850s.
CRITICAL ~~~ll~~tM~l~l~’~ AND
AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE 1850s
Critical realignments apparently occur infrequently because
most voters develop a strong psychological attachment to one
of the contending parties which moves them to vote regularly
for it over a number of elections (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller,
1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Eulau and
Schneider, 1956). People who identify with a party tend to vote
for it regularly, despite changes in the issues at stake and the
slates of candidates pursuing public office. In part, regular
voting arises because identifiers are disposed to cast their ballots
for the favored party even before the election campaign begins.
This inclination is sustained during the campaign because the
citizens&dquo; sense of identity with a party colors their perception of
the candidates and issues. People who identify with a party are
prepared to approve of their party’s nominees and to suspect
the opposition’s candidates; they accept their party’s stand on
the issues and reject the positions adopted by the opposition
(Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Belknap and
Campbell, 1951-1952; Converse and Dupeux, 1967). Although
the circumstances unique to a campaign occasionally prompt
some members of the &dquo;party-in-the-electorate&dquo; (Key, 1953:
181) to vote for its rival, the defection is usually short-lived and
does not involve a shift in party identification (Converse,
Campbell, Miller, and Stokes, 1961). As a consequence, the
occasions when the electoral bedrock of the Republic shifts are
extraordinary events. Indeed, the electorate has undergone
sudden realignment on a massive scale only three times since the
second national two-party system emerged during the Jackson
and Van Buren administrations: in the 1850s; in the 1890s; and
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in the 1930s (Lowi, 1967). The rarity of these events and the
attendant political significance warrant an intensive investiga-
tion of the process of electoral realignments (for a discussion of
electoral realignments see Sundquist, 1973: 1-38; Key, 1955: f
1-18; Burnham, 1970: 1-10; Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan,
1973).
One general view of major realignments contends that they
occurred when an issue, urgent and vital to a large number of
the citizens, intruded to cut across the existing partisan ties
(Sundquist, 1973: 1-38). This characterization contains two
essential points. First, for a pressing issue to trigger a realign-
ment, it must arouse strong disagreement among the voters. If
there is great concern but little disagreement (an attack by a
foreign power, for example), then the voters need not shift their
partisan preferences. Second, each party must contain sizable
blocs of the antagonists for the realignment to assume major
proportions. If the fracture created by the new issue parallels
that of the existing alignment-that is, if most pros are in one
party and most cons are in the other-then the existing
alignment can accommodate the strain introduced by the new
issue with only a few voters switching their party loyalties.
When a crucial issue bursts upon the political scene and
produces dissensions within each party, then the stage is set for
a major realignment of the electorate.
This cross-cutting issue model of a realignment, in which
regular voting patterns are disrupted by a salient political
question, is usually found in the mainstream political histories
of the 1850s. The political narratives typically depict a stable
electoral alignment between the Whig and Democratic parties
being destroyed by the sudden intrusion of the slavery
expansion issue (see, e.g., Filler, 1960; Smith, 1967; Nevins,
1947). National politics from the time of Andrew Jackson’s
presidency until the 1854 election revolved around the contest
for office between Whig and Democratic politicians. Minor
parties (notably the Liberty and later the Free Soil parties)
competed for the electorate’s votes, but the central question
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posed by the campaigns of the day was whether Whigs or
Democrats would rule. Although the attitudes underlying the
Democrat-Whig voter alignment have yet to be fmnly estab-
lished, historians have detected substantial differences between
the party leaders’ views on a variety of issues ranging from the
proper role of the government in the economy to a general
disposition towards refonn (Ershkowitz and Shade, 1971).
Studies of nineteenth-century voting patterns also suggest that
ethnic and religious differences underlay many voters’ party
preference (Benson, 1967; Fonnisano, 1971). For whatever
reason, however, the individual voter throughout this period
apparently aligned himself with one of the parties because the
electorate evidenced considerable stability in party choice
(Shortridge, 1974).
The literature describes the shattering impact of the slavery
extension issue on the voter alignment of the Democrat-Whig
system. During this period, the question of slavery had been
excluded from partisan controversy by the leaders of the two
major parties. However, the disposition of vast territory won
during the war with Mexico reintroduced slavery into politics,
and the nation was staggered by the crisis. It seemed that
resolution was achieved with the Compromise of 1850. Then,
four years later, the North was shocked when the Democratic
party leaders violated the Compromise of 1820 by pushing the
Kansas-Nebraska bill through Congress. This bill opened the
territories to slavery by permitting slaveholders to settle in the
land north of the southern boundary of Missouri. Immediately,
the political rhetoric became centered upon the slavery
extension issue, and the political consciousness of the American
public was assaulted with inflammatory denunciations,
apologias, charges, and counter-charges-all designed to per-
suade the citizen that the fate of democracy, or of a salubrious
society, or of one’s own immediate interests was bound up in
the resolution of the slavery question. Political histories of the
period typically reflect this preoccupation with slavery, pain-
stakingly tracing the origins of the anti-slavery political move-
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ment and describing the anti-slavery campaigning of the
Republican party. According to this view, the Kansas-Nebraska
bill, bleeding Kansas, and the Dred Scott decision impelled an
outraged Northern public to flock to the Republican banner.
Within six years, the Democracy had lost its hegemony to the
new Republican party.
The new Republican party was organized explicitly to
combat the extension of slavery into the Nebraska Territory.
The sectional appeal of the Republicans was a feasible strategy
for acquiring control of the national government because
Northern states possessed more than half of the votes in the
Electoral College. Republican strategists saw that they could
capture the Presidency and the House of Representatives
without any Southern support if they could attain hegemony
over the North. However, to win in the North, the Republican
party had to defeat the formidable Democratic party in
virtually every state. In 1852, the Democratic party received
49.9% of the vote while carrying 416 of the 612 (68.0%) of the
Northern counties, while its principal adversary, the Whig party,
attracted 43.6% of the vote.! In short, the Republican strategy
envisaged, indeed required, a major realignment among the
Northern electorate-a shift of many Northern voters to the
Republican party. The strategy succeeded. In the 1856
Presidential election, the Republicans received 46.3% of the
vote cast in the Northern states while the Democrats received
41.1 %. In 1860, Lincoln led his party to victory by garnering
54.6% of the vote cast and carrying 490 of the 703 counties
(69.7%) in these states. The Republican ascendancy in the
North commenced during this realignment period and prevailed
in Presidential elections for the remainder of the century.
Where did the Republicans obtain the votes which made
them the dominant party in the North? The search for an
answer is eased by the fact that, at that time, the Midwest had
only a limited number of voter reservoirs: (1) people who voted
Democrat in 1852; (2) people who voted Free Soil in 1852; (3)
people who voted Whig in 1852; (4) people who abstained in
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1 B 5 ~; (5) and people who were ineligible to vote in 1852.
Individuals from each of these groups undoubtedly moved into
the Republican fold. Hence, a crucial issue lies in assessing the
tendency of people in each of these categories to vote
Republican in subsequent elections&horbar;that is, measuring the
proportion of each group which later cast Republican ballots.
This analytical approach breaks down the large question
regarding the origins of the Republican votes into a few more
focused inquiries: Did a large proportion of Democrats Cross
over to the Republican party? Did a fusion process coalesce
Whigs and Free Soilers into the new party? Did the Republicans
mobilize many heretofore nonvoters into their constituency?
Finally, did the realignment occur in a single election or extend
over a series of elections?2
The typical presentation of the period suggests that the furor
over the slavery extension issue disoriented considerable
numbers of people and dislodged them from their previous
party loyalties. In particular, the histories lead one to suspect
that many Northern Democrats defected to the Republicans.
Eric Foner, for example, in his penetrating study of the
Republican ideology, contends that the Republicans attracted
the support of a significant number of rank-and-file Democrats
(Foner, 1970: 149-185; Sundquist, 1973: 39-91). Yet, the
margin needed for a Republican victory was not so great as to
require massive defections from the Democracy. An equally
plausible hypothesis is that the Republican party drew support
from disparate groups within the electorate who were outside
the Democratic fold-Whigs who had nowhere else to go; Free
Soilers who would be attracted by the Republican party’s
unequivocal stand against the expansion of slavery; and those
who previously had not voted regularly in national elections. By
cementing these blocs of voters together into a new political
coalition, the Republicans could amass a triumphant electoral
majority.
[199]
THE SCOPE AND PROCEDURES OF THE STUDY
The inquiry focuses on four Midwestern states-Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio-for a number of reasons. First, the
region contained a large segment of the North’s population
since over a third of the votes cast in the North during this
period were cast in these fpur states. Second, the Whig-
Democrat two-party system was deeply rooted; together these
two major parties consistently polled 90% or more of the vote
cast in Presidential elections from 1840 through 1852. More-
over, the reorganization of the Midwestern party system during
the 1850s paralleled the process occurring elsewhere in the
North. In 1852, the Democracy garnered 49.9% of the vote in
these states compared with the Whig’s 42.9%. The Republicans
and Democrats closely contested the 1856 election with both
parties receiving about 45% of the vote cast. In 1860, the
Republicans soundly defeated the Democrats in these states,
52.2% to 43.6%. These particular Midwestern states were
selected because they held elections throughout the Whig-
Democrat years, 1840-1852. The new Midwestern states, such
as Iowa or Wisconsin, were not in the Union during much of
that period and hence have a more abbreviated temporal span
over which the electorate’s voting patterns can be examined.
Finally, the statistical techniques’used in the inquiry require
that a substantial number of counties be included in the
analysis. For this period, the analysis draws upon about 90
counties in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio and about 35 in
Michigan, or a total of more than 300 counties for the four
states. Because the new states contained only a few thickly
settled counties at this time, one can have only limited
confidence in the estimates produced by the statistical pro-
cedures. However, the electorates in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
and Ohio cast 82.5% of the votes recorded in the Midwest in the
1856 Presidential election; this suggests that excluding the
newer Midwestern states does not seriously reduce the gener-
ality of the findings.
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In 1852, the Presidential year immediately preceding the
formation of the Republican party, the Midwestern electorate
faced four possibilities: casting a Democratic ballot; casting a
Whig ballot; casting a Free soil ballot; or abstaining. The 1856
Presidential election posed four choices: voting Democrat,
Republican, American or abstaining. Although three parties
campaigned in the Midwest in 1860, so few people cast ballots
for the Union party that the real options for the electorate seem
to have been voting Democrat or Republican or abstaining. A
systematic examination of the realignment process for this
period entails observing the subsequent choices made by the
supporters of both the major and minor political parties and
also the subsequent actions of those who abstained in a
particular election.
Ideally, the flow of the vote during the realignment would be
examined by observing the choices made by individual voters in
successive elections. However, only a few records containing the
voting choices made by individual citizens survive, mostly in the
form of poll books in which the publicly announced choice of
each voter was recorded. However, during the first few decades
of the nineteenth century, voting by ballot generally superseded
viva voce voting. By 1840, the use of poll books was no longer
the common practice in the Midwest although Illinois persisted
in the anachronistic practice until 1849. Hence, an inquiry into
the flow of the vote must employ aggregate election data rather
than individual voting records for the realignment period. The
aggregate data have an advantage in that they comprehensively
cover the general voting population for the four states. _
This study analyzes election data aggregated at the county
level and infers the patterns for individuals from that county
level information. Specifically, the variables in the analysis
consist of the proportion of the estimated eligible voting
population which voted for each party-called party turnout-
and the proportion which abstained in Presidential elections
between 1840 and 1860. Party turnout was computed by
dividing the number of votes cast for the party by the number
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of eligible voters estimated to have been living in a county
during the election. Public records, of course, report the
number of ballots cast for each party in an election, but they do
not contain a count for the size of the eligible voting
population. Consequently, the number of eligible voters had to
be estimated from the United States Census. The number of
white adult males enumerated by the census was used as the
estimate for the eligible voting population for the census years,
with the number for intercensus years calculated by linear
interpolation. 3
Using aggregate data to infer individual level behavior raises
the issue of the &dquo;ecological fallacy.&dquo; The ecological fallacy is
the assumption that the zero-order correlation calculated for a
distribution of counties (or other areal unit) along two variables
accurately measures the association between the variables
among the individuals within those counties (Robinson, 1950;
Alker, 1969: 101-106). Since the ecological fallacy was initially
discussed, a number of procedures for obtaining less specious
estimates have been developed (Duncan and Davis, 1953;
Converse, 1969). This analysis employs the coefficients ob-
tained from &dquo;ecological regression&dquo; to estimate the individual
level patterns (Goodman, 1953, 1959).
As an example, in this study ecological regression may entail
regressing the party turnout for the Republican slate in an
election on the party turnout for the Republican ticket in the
previous election across a set of counties. The coefficients are
then used to estimate the proportion of Republican voters of
the first election who cast Republican ballots in the second in
the area encompassed by the counties. The following equation
represents this procedure:
where (as in the example) Yj is the Republican turnout in time
two in the j-th county, bo is the intercept, be is the coefficient
for X1 ~, the Republican turnout in time one in the j-th county,
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and E. is the residual for the j-th county. The intercept is an
estimate for the proportion of non-Republicans in the first
election who change their behavior by voting Republican in the
next election. The sum of the intercept and the coefficient, be,
is an estimate for the proportion of the Republican voters in the
first election who again cast a Republican ballot in the
subsequent election. One may substitute the Democratic per-
centages for Xl and obtain estimates for the proportion of
Democrats who switched to the Republicans in the second
election. The percentages produced by the regressions are
measuring proportions of the statewide electorate. To control
for the disproportionate impact which a few sparsely settled
counties might have on the estimates, a parallel analysis was
performed in which the units were weighted by population
density. There was, however, little difference observed between
the weighted and unweighted estimates. To facilitate a parsimo-
nious display of the data, the tables present only the un-
weighted estimates.
Use of this estimating model entails several assumptions
about the world being described. First of all, one must assume
that there are no aggregate level effects. The necessity for this
assumption can be appreciated by examining equation 2, which
presents the regression model that could be used if both
individual and aggregate level data were available.
Within the context of this study, Yij indicates whether the
individual voted Republican in an election; bo is the intercept;
bi is the coefficient for X~., the Republican turnout in theJ
previous election; b2 is the coefficient for X~., whether the i-thJ
person voted Republican in the previous election; b3 is the
coefficient for X~.X;., the interactive term; and E is the residual.
The coefficient for the interactive term in the complete data
model, b 3 , can be estimated by introducing an exponential
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variable in the ecological regression equation which is the square
of the party turnout for each county.’ The coefficients for this
exponential term were generally trivial, indicating that there
was little influence on party choice in an election by the
interaction between party choice and party strength in the
preceding election. There is no way, unfortunately, to obtain
separate measures for the aggregate level and individual level
coefficients produced by the complete data model from the
ecological regression model. This complete data model
produces discrete measures for the influence of individual and
aggregate factors (the regression coefficients bl and b2).
However, the ecological regression model produces only one
coefficient, be , which is assumed to be the coefficient for the
individual level effect, b2, in the complete data model (Boyd,
1971). For be to equal b2, one must assume that b1 equals
zero-that is, no aggregate level effect.
Use of the ecological regression procedure to estimate the
transitional probabilities of party choice from one election to
another violates the assumption that the population was closed.
The electorate within the counties obviously changed from year
to year because some of the people present during the first
campaign died or moved by the second campaign and some of
those present during the second campaign attained their
majority or moved into the area subsequent to the first
campaign. Violating the closed population assumption intro-
duces random variation into the bivariate distribution for the
party turnout levels recorded for the counties in successive
elections. The effect of this artifactual variation is to bias the
intercept towards the mean party turnout computed for the
counties and to bias the ecological regression coefficient
towards zero. These biases tend to minimize differences in the
subsequent party choice between the electoral groups. The
presence of a conservative bias in the estimates serves to
increase the confidence one has in any differences which emerge
in the analysis.
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THE REALIGNMENT : DEMOCRATIC COHESION
Political histories of the 1850s typically depict the
Democratic electoral majority crumbling under the repeated
pro-slavery blows administered by the party’s own leadership.
Yet the evidence from the election records suggests that the
Democratic party continued to receive voting support from a
large proportion of the electorate during the slavery expansion
controversy. As Figure 1 shows, in 1856 and 1860 (the
campaigns waged during the height of the slavery controversy)
the proportion of the electorate voting Democrat matched that
garnered by Democratic slates in 1848 and 1852. The election
Figure 1: Estimated Porportion of Eligible Etectora~ Casting Whig/Republican or
Democratic Ballots in Presidential Elections in the Four Midwestern States,
184M860
[205]
returns suggest, then, that the Democratic voting support did
not suffer a decline with the intrusion of the slavery extension
issue into national politics in 1854. _
The regional percentages could, of course, be masking
considerable volatility among the individuals supporting the
Democracy during this period. Perhaps the defection of some
Democrats to the Republican party was counterbalanced by a
swing to the Democratic party by many disaffected ex-Whigs.
To assess whether individuals voting Democratic in 1852
persisted in voting for that party after the emergence of the
Republican party, estimates for the proportion of Pierce voters
who cast Buchanan ballots were obtained by regressing the
1856 Democratic turnout on the 1852 Democratic turnout. If
the Democratic constituency within the voting public indeed
crumbled, one would expect that a rather low percentage of
1852 Democrats voted Democratic in 1856. 
,
The estimates presented in Table 1 indicate that 90% of the
1852 Democrats in Illinois and Indiana repeated that choice, in
1856 and that more than 60% and 70% of them did so in
Michigan and Ohio, respectively. Apparently, only about a third
of the 1852 Democratic voters throughout the Midwest failed
to support the party in 1856. Did this comprise an extra-
ordinarily large decline in support? One way of answering this
question is to examine the patterns in voting Democrat in
successive elections estimated for the preslavery-issue period.
The first row in Table 2 presents the average for the proportion
of people casting Democratic ballots in three pairs of Presi-
dential elections (1840-1844, 1844-1848, 1848-1852) during
the Whig-Democratic party system. The stability in the
Democratic constituency between two elections during the
stressful period of the mid-1850s compares favorably with the
persistence in voting Democrat estimated for the 1840-1852
era, although the party fared less well in Ohio in this regard.
According to the estimates, an average of 81% of the Demo-
cratic voters in the Midwest cast Democratic ballots in
successive Presidential elections during the 1840s as compared
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TABLE 1
Estimated Proportion of Democratic Voters Casting
Democratic Battots in Subsequent Election
TABLE 2
Average for the Estimated Proportion of Democratic Voters
Casting Democratic or Whig Ballots in Subsequent
Presidential Election, 1840-1852
with an average of 82% for the 1852-1856 elections. Evidently,
the Democratic constituency did not disintegrate under the
impact of the slavery controversy. Instead, the party apparently
lost the usual number of people who failed to repeat their
Democratic vote and retained the support of the usual number
of voters who normally cast Democratic ballots in successive
elections. At the individual level, the slavery extension issue did
not seem to affect the Democratic constituency.
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THE REALIGNMENT:
THE FLOW TO THE FTEPURLI CANS
The swing in the balance of power during this period must be
due to a flow of votes to the major opposition to the
Democratic party, the new Republican party, rather than an
ebbing of disaffected voters from the Democracy. A plot of the
Republican turnout for each state reveals that the timing of the
influx differed. The Republicans acquired a high proportion of
the eligible electorate immediately with the 1856 campaign in
Michigan, but experienced a distinct surge of support in 1860 in
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio (see Figure 2). Examination of these
phenomena offers insights into the realigning process.
fi~~~~~ .
What were the political backgrounds of those people who
cast Republican ballots in 18 56? Surely, one would expect that
many 1852 Free Soil voters would support the Republican
ticket in 1856. The Free Soil party was organized in 1848 to
prevent slavery from being implanted in the territories wrested
from Mexico. When the Democratic leadership unexpectedly
embraced a pro-slavery position in 1854, many Northern
politicians quickly adopted Free Soilism as their own, but under
the Republican banner. With Free Soilism as the heart of
Republicanism, and with many Free Soil politicians holding
prominent positions in the new party, a staunch Free Soiler
could readily support the Republican party. Presumably, the
same political views which prompted his Free Soil vote in 1852
would lead him to vote Republican in 1856. This interpretation
predicts, then, that a large proportion of the 1852 Free Soil
voters would vote for the Republican slate in 1856.
Testing this hypothesis entails estimating the proportion of
Free Soil voters who voted Republican in 1856 with the
ecological regression procedure. If the Free Soilers did tend to
move into the Republican party, then the proportion of Free
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Soil voters casting Republican ballots should exceed the
proportion of those who did not. The estimates presented in the
first row of Table 3 indicate that more than 100% of the 1852
Free Soil voters supported the Republican slate in 1856. This is,
of course, impossible. The ecological regression might have
produced these excessively high estimates because the pro-
cedure is insufficiently precise to handle the small percentages
involved with the Free Soil turnout variable. Only about 5% of
the eligible Midwestern electorate estimated for 1852 voted for
the Free Soil party, while over 35% of the eligible electorate in
1856 cast Republican ballots. However, the estimates do suggest
that a large proportion of the 1852 Free Soil voters moved into
the Republican ranks in 1856.
The Republican party’s leadership cadre contained a sur-
prisingly large number of ex-Democrats. Several Republican
Senators and governors elected during the 1850s had defected
from the Democracy. For example, four members of Lincoln’s
nrst cabinet (Blair, Cameron, Chase and Welles) were Demo-
cratic defectors. This strong Democratic presence in the
Republican elite has led some historians to contend that a
sizable proportion of the Democratic rank-in-file also moved
into the Republican fold. Although at least one historian has
cautioned against inferring like behavior for politicians and
electorate (Stoler, 1940), political studies of the period at-
tribute considerable importance to the influx of ex-Democratic
voters into the Republican coalition.
TABLE 3
Estimated Proportion of 1852 Electoral Groups
Casting Republican Ballots in 1856
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This point of view can be tested by considering the estimates
for the proportion of 1852 Democratic voters who cast their
1856 ballots for the Fremont ticket. Table I suggests that most
1852 Democrats continued to vote Democrat in the next
Presidential election, but about a fifth did not. If they moved as
a group behind the Republican banner, then they would have
comprised a sizable proportion of the new party’s voting
strength. The estimates found in the second row of Table 3 are
derived from the coefficients computed by regressing the 1856
Republican turnout upon the 1852 Democratic turnout. The
percentages estimated by the regression vary somewhat across
the four states. The highest estimate was calculated for
Michigan where perhaps 28% of the people voting Democrat in
1852 voted Republican in 1856. The rates were far lower in the
more populous states, however. On the whole, the estimates
suggest that only about 11 % of the 1852 Democratic voters
supported the Republican party in 1856 across the Midwest.
Whether the defection of about 11 % of the Midwestern
Democratic voters of 1852 to the 1856 Republican ticket
signified a marked departure in behavior can be assessed by
examining the proportion of Democratic voters in elections
during the 1840-1852 period who subsequently voted Whig.
The second row in Table 2 presents the average for the three
p airs of Presidential elections (1840-1844, 1844-1848,
1848-1852) for the four Midwestern states.
Throughout the dozen years of the Whig-Democrat two-party
system following 1840, a small percentage of the Democratic
voters of one Presidential election would cast a ballot for the
Whig opposition in the next campaign. That is, normally one
would find about 10% of the Democratic voters voting for the
opposition in the following election. This defection rate is on
the same low level of magnitude as the proportion of 1852
Democratic voters who defected to the Republicans in 1856. In
light of this general pattern, the movement of a small
proportion of 1852 Democratic voters to the Republican slate
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in 1856 cannot be viewed as a crucial new element in producing
the realignment.
Third, one might suppose that a large number of former Whig
voters moved into the Republican party in 1~56. For one thing,
the positions adopted by the Republican platform on economic
issues such as a transcontinental railroad and government
financed improvement of rivers and harbors were consonant
with those advanced by the Whigs over the preceding decade or
two. Moreover, many of the leaders in the new Republican
party were ex-Whig politicians. Important aspects of the
Republican party, then, seemingly would appear familiar and
unobjectionable to Whig voters facing a new party system in
1856. Certainly, the Republican party would provide a more
comfortable political home for ex-Whigs than would their old
adversary, the Democracy.
Whether many Whigs seemed to move into the Republican
party can be answered by examining the estimates for the
percent of 1852 Whigs who voted Republican in 1856. The
estimates in the third row of Table 3 are obtained by regressing
the 1856 Republican turnout on the 1852 Whig turnout. The
estimates suggest that well over half of the 1852 Whigs cast
Republican ballots in 1856-indicating a strong pro-Republican
movement on the part of many rank-and-file Whigs into the new
party’s electoral coalition.
How does the rate at which Whigs flowed into the
Republican party compare with the stability in the Whig vote
during the preceding decade? Table 4 presents the average for
the proportion of Whig voters casting Whig ballots in the next
TABLE 4
Average for the Estimated Proportion of Whig Voters
Casting Whig Ballots in Subsequent
Presidential Elections, 1840-1852
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Presidential election for the states in the three pairs Qt
Presidential elections between 1840 and 1852 (1840-1844~
1844-1848, 1848-1852). The level of stability of the Whig vote
in Indiana and Michigan during the 1840-1852 period was on
the same order of magnitude as the proportion of the 1852
Whigs who cast Republican ballots in 1856. That is, the
Republicans attracted the support of the same proportion of
1852 Whig voters as the Whig politicians might have expected if
their party had survived to contest the 1856 campaign. In
Illinois and Ohio, however, the proportion of 1.852 Whigs voting
Republican fell between 20% and 30% below the average
proportion of people casting Whig ballots in successive Presi-
dential elections. These important differences notwithstanding,
in each state more than half of the people supporting the Whig
ticket in its final national campaign apparently moved into the
Republican ranks in 1856.
The final possible source for Republican votes in 1856 was
the group of people who abstained in 1852. These citizens are
usually overlooked in the, historical literature, perhaps because
nonvoting is viewed as an occasional lapse on the part of
normally active voters. However, elsewhere I show that the
electorate apparently contained a group of people who tended
not to vote in successive elections (Shortridge, 1974; n.d.). This
group of nonvoters seems to have been uninterested in the
issues and personalities present in the political arena during the
second American party system. Perhaps the Republican crusade
to prevent the extension of slavery into the territories aroused
the interest of those who regularly abstained. Specifically, did
the nonvoters in the Scott-Pierce campaign move to the support
of the Fremont ticket in 1856? This question can be answered
by examining the estimates for the proportion of 1852
abstainers who cast Republican ballots in 1856.
Estimates presented in the fourth row of Table 3 reveal that
the strength of the pro-Republican movement by the 1852
abstainers varied among the four states. These estimates suggest
that very few 1852 nonvoters turned out for Fremont in
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Indiana and Ohio and only a small proportion (23%) did so in
Blinois. A more sizable proportion of 1852 abstainers were
estimated to have supported the Republicans in 1856 in
Michigan. The marked difference in behavior across the four
states suggests that the nonvoters did not make a consistently
strong contribution to the 1856 Republican vote.
A few general patterns in the flow of the vote to the
Republican party in 1856 emerged from the estimates produced
by the analysis. First of all, Democratic voters apparently did
not cross over to the Republican party in unprecedented
numbers. The relatively small proportion of 1852 Democrats
casting Republican ballots in 1856 was only slightly higher than
the normal proportion of Democratic voters crossing over to the
Whig party during the 1840-1852 period. Second, in the three
more populous states (Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio), only a small
proportion of those who abstained in 1852 supported the
Republican ticket in 1856. However, in Michigan, where the
Republican party received a substantially higher turnout than
did the Whigs four years earlier (45.7% and 28.6%, respec-
tively-see Figure 2), perhaps one-half of the 1852 abstainers
cast Republican ballots in 1856. Since about 30% of the
Michigan electorate abstained in 1852, those nonvoters who
subsequently supported Fremont comprised an important
element in the Republican constituency in Michigan. Third, well
over half of the 1852 Whig voters in the Midwest evidently cast
Republican ballots in 1856. The Whig party received the votes
of about 31% of the 1852 electorate in the region-the large
proportion of this group aligning itself behind the Republican
banner in 1856 represented an important segment of the new
party’s Midwestern electoral coalition. Finally, the Free Soil
voters evidenced the strongest propensity to vote Republican.
Although they comprised only about 5% of the 1852 Midwest
electorate, they appear to have moved virtually en masse into
the Republican ranks in 1856.
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Figure 2: Estimated Proportion of Eligible Electorate Casting Whig or Republican
Ballots itt Each State, in Presidential Elections, 1840-1860
l[8SM860
For the three more populous Midwestern states&horbar;niinoM,
Indiana, and Ohio-the surge of voters to the Republican party
which assured its hegemony over the region did not occur until
the 1860 election. This section examines the flow of the vote in
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the last half of the decade in these states to complete the
inquiry into the 1850s realignment. The analysis of election
data for the 1856-1860 period suggests that the Republican
vote in 1860 consisted of two distinguishable groups: a very
reliable core comprised of those people who voted for Fremont
in 1856 and a group of voters who were outside the Republican
fold in 1856 but joined the Republican constituency in 1860.
Turning first ¢to the core voters, the first row in Table 5
presents the estimates for the proportion of 1856 Republican
voters casting Republican ballots in 1860. The estimates suggest
that a very high percentage of the 1856 Republican voters
persisted in that choice in 1860. In each of these three states,
more than 90% of the 1856 Republican voters voted for
Lincoln. Apparently, the 1856 Republican voters provided the
party with a sizable reliable voting bloc upon which to build
their winning electoral coalition.
Whence the voters shifting to the Republican party in 1860?
One possibility is that a significant number of former Demo-
cratic voters crossed over to the Republican party. Although
most of those people who voted for Buchanan in 1856 also
apparently supported Douglas in 1860 (see Table 1), some did
not, and this latter group might have moved to the Republican
fold. One might speculate that a number of Democrats became
disaffected with their party’s intransigence on the slavery issue
and became dismayed with the events in Kansas and with the
Dred Scott decision. Their confidence in the Democracy might
also have been undermined by the Southern influence in the
Buchanan Administration manifested in the vetoes of home-
stead bills and other economic programs important to the North
(Van Deusen, 1965: 5-6, 12). One might conclude that they
belatedly broke with their party and voted for Lincoln.
This delayed-Democratic-defection explanation for the surge
in the Republican strength observed in 1860 can be tested by
examining the estimates for the proportion of 1856 Buchanan
voters casting Lincoln ballots presented in the second row of
Table 5. These estimates indicate that ex-Democratic voters
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TABLE 5
Estimated Proportion of 1856 Electoral Groups
Casting Republican BaJlots in 1860
made only a modest contribution to the 1860 Republican surge;
only a small proportion of the people voting Democrat in 1856
in these states switched their vote to the Republican ticket in
1860. The surge to the Republicans observed between 1856 and
1860 is not attributable to a conversion of a sizable group of
people who voted Democrat in 1856.
Another possible source for Republican support lies in the
1856 American party supporters. In 1856, Millard Fillmore led
a political party organized to advance nativist principles&horbar;
notably restricting public office to native-born citizens and
tightening the immigration laws. This party, the American
party, attracted the votes of a considerable number of the
estimated eligible electorate in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio
(11.1%, 8.3%~ and 5.5%, respectively). The American party did
not contest the 1860 election in the Midwest. Consequently, if
a high proportion of its supporters cast their ballot for Lincoln
in 1860, the nativist flow into the Republican party could have
provided a significant component to the surge in Republican
turnout for that election.
This explanation can be assessed by examining the estimates
for the proportion of 1856 nativist voters who flowed into the
Republican party during the 1860 election. The estimates,
presented in the third row of Table 5, suggest that more than
60% of the 1856 nativist voters switched to the Republican
party for the 1860 election. An important element in the surge
in the 1860 Republican vote apparently stemmed from large




Estimated Proportion of 1. Non~Vote~ C3tti-ng
RepttMtca~ or B~n~cr~c~~teMS in 1860
The final source for additional Republican voters during the
Lincoln campaign is comprised of those who abstained in 1856.
Possibly, the Republicans succeeded in mobilizing considerable
numbers of normally apathetic citizens during the 1860
campaign because of the increased furor over the slavery issue.
The first row in Table 6 presents the estimates for the
proportion of 1856 nonvoters who subsequently cast their
ballots for Lincoln. These estimates indicate that about 40% of
the 1856 nonvoters turned out for Lincoln in Indiana and about
30% of them did so in Illinois and Ohio. 
°
However, in 1860 the Democracy also received the votes of
large numbers of 1856 abstainers. As the second row in Table 6
indicates, the pro-Democrat movement across the states
mirrored the pro-Republican shift. The proportion of 1856
nonvoters casting Democratic ballots in 1860 was almost the
same in each state as the proportion casting Republican ballots.
This suggests that the Republicans’ strongly anti-slavery posi-
tion and its economic policies did not have a more potent
saliency to the nonvoting group within the Midwestern elec-
torate than the Democratic positions on these issues.
However, in 1860 the Republicans apparently attracted a
greater proportion of the 1856 nonvoting group than the Whigs
were accustomed to attracting from the nonvoters during the
second American party system. Table 7 presents the proportion
of abstainers voting Whig or Democrat in the subsequent
election for the three pairs of Presidential elections in the 1840
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TABLE 7
Estimated Proportion of Non-Voters Casting
Whig or Democratic Ballots in Subsequent
Presidential Elections, 1840-1852
to 1852 period. The Republicans apparently mobilized about
twice as many people from the abstaining group in 1860 as the
Whigs usually did in the earlier period. On the other hand, the
movement by 1856 nonvoters to the Democratic slate in 1860
merely reflected a long-term pattern in which the Democrats
normally garnered the votes of about 15% of the people who
abstained in the preceding election.
A general pattern emerges in the surge in Republican strength
between 1856 and 1860 observed in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.
The Republican vote in 1860 seems to have contained two
distinct elements. The first element was a solid core consisting
of those people who cast Republican ballots in 1856. About
33% of the electorate in these three states voted Republican in
1856 and more than 90% of them apparently supported Lincoln
in 1860. The second element was the shift to the Republican
party by people who had not supported the party in 1856. The
Republicans attracted votes principally from those who
abstained in 1856 and those who followed the nativist banner.
Evidently, very few of those voting Democratic in 1856 crossed
over to the Republican party and voted for Lincoln. The 1856
nonvoters, who comprised about 23% of the electorate at that
time, exhibited slightly pro-Republican leanings in 1860.
Perhaps 25% of them switched to the Republican party in 1860
while a slightly lower proportion (about 20%) supported the
Democracy. A stronger movement to the Republican party was
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apparently made by the_ people who voted nativist in 1856-the
American party garnered about 7% of the electorate in the
Midwest. According to the estimates about two-thirds of the
1856 American party voters in these three states supported
Lincoln in 1860. In general~ then, the people who voted
Democrat or Republican in 1856 tended to persist in that
choice in 1860. The surge to the Republicans during the
Lincoln campaign evidently came in part from some of the
1856 nonvoters, but principally from the shift of a large
proportion of the 1856 nativist party voters.
~ 
CONCLUSIONS
The realignment process in the Midwest during the 1850s
varied somewhat among the four most populous states. In
Michigan, the major shift to the Republicans occurred in one
stage; in 1856, most of the Free Soilers, Whigs, and a large
proportion of the nonvoters of the 1852 campaign moved into
the Republican ranks. In Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, however,
two distinct stages emerged in the movement of the electorate
to the Republican banner. According to the estimates, the 1852
to 1856 stage consisted largely of the fusion of most Free
Soilers and a sizable proportion of Whig voters of the 1852
election into a Republican voting bloc in 1856. The con-
stituency resulting from this fusion made the Republican party
a strong competitor of the Democrats in these states but did not
result in dominance. Hegemony came to the Republican party
with the 1860 campaign when the solid bloc of Fremont voters
was apparently augmented by most of the people voting nativist
and some of those who abstained in 1856.
The shift in the balance of power from the Democracy to the
Republicans during the 1850s in these states profoundly altered
the political life of the region and the nation. Political discourse
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during this period was preoccupied with the slavery -extension
issue, and doubtless this controversy aroused deep emotions and
antagonisms. Yet the voting choices made by the mass
electorate seem to have been remarkably stable. Most Demo-
crats apparently resisted the blandishments of the Republican
and nativist politicians and continued to support the
Democracy. Only a small proportion of the people who
abstained in 1852 was estimated&dquo;:to have voted Republican or
nativist in 1856, despite the increasing furor over slavery
extending into the distant territories and the dire warnings
about immigrants acquiring political power in their own
communities. The instability seems to have centered among the
adherents of the now extinct Whig party. Yet, few Whigs
crossed over to their old adversaries, the Democrats, and few
seemed to lose interest in politics and stop voting. By 1860,
most of the 1852 Whigs were apparently casting Republican
ballots. 
&dquo;
The Republican politicians benefited from the fracturing of
the Whig-Democratic party system along two fault lines. The
fault which ultimately defined the polarity of the new party
system appeared in national politics during the 1840s with the
organization of an anti-slavery-extension party, Free Soil, in the
North. When the Democratic party’s leadership blundered over
the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854, aspiring politicians in the
North were able to create the new Republican party which
attracted the votes of the Free Soilers and most of the Whigs. In
the confusion produced by the death of the Whig party, other
politicians sought to exploit the second fault; they attempted to
interest voters in a nativist party, but attracted the support of
only a few. However, the general movement on the part of the
1856 nativist voters toward the Republican party in 1860, plus
the support of some of those who had previously abstained,
enabled Lincoln to swamp the Democratic slate in the region.
The 1850s realignment, then, seems to have entailed two
processes: the 1856 fusion of Free Soil voters and many Whigs
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into a solid core of Republican voters; and the movement of
many 1856 -nativist voters and some 1856 nonvoters into the





1. These statistics are drawn from Walter Dean Burnham (1955). The North
considered here encompasses New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa.
2. For a discussion of the temporal span of a realignment, see V. O. Key, Jr.
(1955, 1959) and Duncan Macrae, Jr. and James A. Meldrum (1960).
3. The data comprising these variables were made available (in part) by the
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The Consortium beats no
responsibility for either the analysis or interpretations reported here.
4. The equation for this multiple regression is: Yj = b0 + b1Xj+ b2Xj+ Ej.
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